Occam’s Razor,
Boltzmann’s Brain
and Wigner’s Friend

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including joint work with
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and old joint work with
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Quantum Information and Cosmology

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• The relation between *Dynamics*—the spontaneous motion or change of a system obeying physical laws—and *Computation*—a programmed sequence of mathematical operations

• Self-organization, exemplified by cellular automata and *logical depth* as a measure of complexity.

• True and False evidence—the Boltzmann Brain problem at equilibrium and in modern cosmology

• Wigner’s Friend—what it feels like to be inside an unmeasured quantum superposition
Simple classical dynamics (such as this 1 dimensional reversible cellular automaton) are easier to analyze and can produce structures of growing “complexity” from simple initial conditions.

Small irregularity (green) in otherwise periodic initial condition produces a complex deterministic wake.
Range-2, deterministic, 1-dimensional Ising rule. Future differs from past if exactly two of the four nearest upper and lower neighbors are black and two are white at the present time.
Occam’s Razor

The most economical hypothesis is to be preferred, even if the deductive path connecting it to the phenomena it explains is long and complicated.

But how does one compare economy of hypotheses in a disinterested way?
Algorithmic information uses a computerized version of the old idea of a monkey at a typewriter eventually typing the works of Shakespeare.

A monkey randomly typing 0s and 1s into a universal binary computer has some chance of getting it to do any computation, produce any output.
This tree of all possible computations is a microcosm of all cause/effect relations that can be demonstrated by deductive reasoning or numerical simulation.
In a computerized version of Occam’s Razor, the hypotheses are replaced by alternative programs for a universal computer to compute a particular digital (or digitized) object $X$.

The shortest program is most plausible, so its *run time* measures the object’s *logical depth*, or plausible amount of computational work required to create the object.
A trivially orderly sequence like 111111... is logically shallow because it can be computed rapidly from a short description.

A typical random sequence, produced by coin tossing, is also logically shallow, because it essentially its own shortest description, and is rapidly computable from that.

Trivial semi-orderly sequences, such as an alternating sequence of 0’s and random bits, are also shallow, since they are rapidly computable from their random part.

(Depth is thus distinct from, and can vary independently from Kolmogorov complexity or algorithmic information content, defined as the size of the minimal description, which is high for random sequences. Algorithmic information measures a sequence’s randomness, not its complexity in the sense intended here.)
Initially, and continuing for some time, the logical depth of a time slice increases with time, corresponding to the duration of the slice’s actual history, in other words the computing time required to simulate its generation from a simple initial condition.
But if the dynamics is allowed to run for a large random time after equilibration (comparable to the system’s Poincaré recurrence time, exponential in its size), the typical time slice becomes shallow and random, with only short-range correlations.

The minimal program for this time slice does not work by retracing its actual long history, but rather a short computation short-circuiting it.
Why is the true history no longer plausible?

Because to specify the state via a simulation of its actual history would involve naming the exact \textbf{number} of steps to run the simulation.

This number is typically very large, requiring about $n$ bits to describe.

Therefore the actual history is no more plausible (in terms of Occam’s razor) than a “print program” that simply outputs the state from a verbatim description.
a Digression and Suggestion

Logical depth, which aims to measure the *dynamical* complexity of a state, nevertheless needs to invoke *descriptive* Kolmogorov complexity in its definition, in order to fairly weight alternative hypotheses as to how the state might have originated.

Circuit complexity measures like **Relative Complexity** have a (fixable) technical problem due to gates being both a descriptive and dynamic resource. The *number* of gates is a dynamic resource, but their *identity* and *positioning* are an unregulated descriptive degree of freedom. To get a clean separation make these requirements:

- The input state must be the quantum version of a Boolean string $|0110101110001\rangle$, instead of just a tensor product.
- The circuit layout should not be variable, but as in standard classical circuit complexity theory, should be given by a fixed classical Turing-DLOGTIME-computable function of the input size $n$. 
In a world at thermal equilibrium, with local interactions, correlations are generically local, mediated through the present.

By contrast, in a non-equilibrium world, local dynamics can generically give rise to long range correlations, mediated through a V-shaped path in space-time representing a common history.
The cellular automaton is a classical toy model, but real systems with fully quantum dynamics behave similarly, losing their complexity, their long-range correlations and even their classical phenomenology as they approach equilibrium.

If the Earth were put in a large reflective box and allowed to come to equilibrium, its state would no longer be complex or even phenomenologically classical.

The entire state in the box would be a microcanonical superposition of near-degenerate energy eigenstates of the closed system. Such states are typically highly entangled and contain only short-range correlations.
How strong is the connection between disequilibrium and complexity, in the sense of logical depth?

Are thermal equilibrium states generically shallow? Classically Yes, by the Gibbs phase rule. For generic parameter values, a locally interacting classical system, of finite spatial dimensionality and at finite temperature, relaxes to a unique phase of lowest bulk free energy.

=> no long term memory
=> depth remains bounded in large N limit

Quantum Exceptions? Toric code in 3 or more dimensions, Localization

Dissipative systems are exempt from the Gibbs phase rule (BG ‘85)
How entanglement hides, creating a classical-appearing world

Massive eavesdropping causes the system to get classically correlated with many parts of its environment. But because of monogamy, it remains entangled only with the whole environment.
Riedel and Zurek have pointed out the role of non-thermal illumination in creating classical correlations in everyday life, e.g. photons from the sun reflecting off objects on the surface of the Earth to produce massively redundant records of their positions.

If these photons continue to propagate away in free space, the system will never equilibrate and the redundant record will be permanent, though inaccessible, even outliving the Earth.

But if the reflected photons were instead trapped inside a reflective box, they would be repeatedly absorbed and re-emitted from the Earth, obfuscating the former redundant correlations as the system equilibrates, and rendering the system no longer classical.
Recall that if a system’s dynamics is allowed to run for a long time after equilibration (comparable to the system’s Poincaré recurrence time) its actual history can no longer be reliably inferred from its present state.

Conversely, a deep structure, one that seems to have had a long history, might just be the result of an unlikely thermal fluctuation, a so-called Boltzmann Brain.
A friend of Boltzmann proposed that the low-entropy world we see may be merely a thermal fluctuation in a much larger universe. “Boltzmann Brain” has come to mean a fluctuation just large enough to produce a momentarily functioning human brain, complete with false memories of a past that didn’t happen, and perceptions of an outside world that doesn’t exist. Soon the BB itself will cease to exist.
Nowadays serious cosmologists worry about Boltzmann Brains
e.g. arxiv:1308.4686

Can the Higgs Boson Save Us From the Menace of the Boltzmann Brains?

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The standard $\Lambda$CDM model provides an excellent fit to current cosmological observations but suffers from a potentially serious Boltzmann Brain problem. If the universe enters a de Sitter vacuum phase that is truly eternal, there will be a finite temperature in empty space and corresponding thermal fluctuations. Among these fluctuations will be intelligent observers, as well as configurations that reproduce any local region of the current universe to arbitrary precision. We discuss the possibility that the escape from this unacceptable situation may be found in known physics: vacuum instability induced by the Higgs field. Avoiding Boltzmann Brains in a measure-independent way requires a decay timescale of order the current age of the universe, which can be achieved if the top quark pole mass is approximately 178 GeV. Otherwise we must invoke new physics or a particular cosmological measure before we can consider $\Lambda$CDM to be an empirical success.
A diabolical conundrum: Boltzmann fluctuations nicely explain the low entropy state of our world, and the arrow of time, but they undermine the scientific method by implying that our picture of the universe, based on observation and reason, is false.

Since disorder increases with time, an infinite universe would be in an equilibrium of disordered particles, with maximum entropy. No intelligent life could exist in the equilibrium, but over an infinite time period random fluctuations would occasionally form temporary pockets of lower entropy.

Eventually, a fluctuation would be large enough to form a conscious brain in empty space. But since our universe would require such an improbably large fluctuation to form, it is more likely that we exist in a smaller fluctuation, and that our past is an illusion or false memory.
Diabolical Conundrum Continued: People began worrying about equilibration in the 19th Century, calling it the “heat death of the universe”, but thought of it as a problem for the far future.

Boltzmann showed us that it is already a problem in the present, undermining our ability to make inferences about conditions in the past or elsewhere, based on those here and now. The inhabitants of any universe that will ultimately equilibrate, either microcanonically or canonically, must make the additional postulate, unsupported by observation, that they are situated atypically early in its history. Otherwise, their “scientific” inferences are no better than those of the inhabitants of Borges’ fictional *Library of Babel* (which contained, randomly shelved, one copy of every possible 410 page book).
Cosmological models like eternal inflation resemble the rest of science in being based on evidence acquired from observation and experiment. But if this doesn’t work, could we not fall back on defining the set of “all possible universes” in a purely mathematical way, untainted by physics?

Yes—use the universal probability defined by the Monkey Tree, despite its being only semicomputable. (cf Juergen Schmidhuber *Algorithmic Theories of Everything* arXiv:quant-ph/0011122)

But that gives too easy an answer to the question of self-organization: By virtue of its computational universality, a positive measure fraction of the Monkey Tree is devoted to self-organizing behavior, according to any computable definition thereof.
But before going so far, do we want to include any “universal” physical principles in the universal prior?

- Reversibility? (very physical, but tends to lead to equilibrium)
- Superposition – quantum mechanics
- Locality / field theories? (Lloyd and Dryer ‘s universal path integral arxiv:1302.2850)
- Fault-tolerance, stability w.r.t.
  - Noise = positive temperature
  - Variation of the model’s continuous parameters, e.g. interaction energies, transition probabilities

Conway’s game of life is irreversible, computationally universal, but doesn’t look very physical or noise-tolerant
The 1-d Ising cellular automaton shown earlier is reversible, looks to be computationally universal, but is not noise-tolerant
Gacs’ 1-d probabilistic cellular automaton is irreversible (does not obey detailed balance) but is universal and fault tolerant
Probabilistic cellular automata that are irreversible (i.e. do not obey detailed balance) are reasonable models for parts of the universe, such as our earth, with equilibration-preventing environments, environments that keep them classical (in the quantum Darwinism sense), or universes that have a live youth and a cold dead old age, preventing Boltzmann fluctuations.

Peter Gacs has shown that there are automata of this sort even in one dimension that are computationally universal, noise-tolerant (all local transition probabilities positive) and stable with respect to generic small perturbations of these transition probabilities. Moreover they can self-organize into a hierarchically encoded computation starting from a translationally invariant initial condition. The encoded computation receives its input via the transition probabilities, and is stable with respect to small perturbations of them. (cf Gacs 1985 JCSS paper and remote workshop talk)
Wigner’s Friend

Schrödinger’s infamous cat is in a superposition of alive and dead before the box is opened.

Eugene Wigner imagined a gentler experiment, relevant to the Quantum Boltzmann Brain problem:

Wigner’s friend performs a quantum measurement with two outcomes but only tells Wigner what happened later.

After the experiment, but before Wigner hears the result, Wigner regards his friend as being in a superposition of two states, but the friend perceives only one or the other of them.

In principle (and even in practice, for atom-sized friends) Wigner can contrive for the friend to undo the measurement and forget its result—a “quantum eraser” experiment.
Wigner’s friend might have been viewed as no more than a philosophical conundrum, but it is relevant to the anthropic counting of observers.

In a 2014 sequel to their 2013 paper, Boddy and Carroll, joined by Pollack, argue that it is not necessary for the universe to self-destruct to avoid the menace of Boltzmann brains. They instead argue that the late thermal state of the universe doesn’t generate any Boltzmann brains because there is no mechanism to observe them, in the strong sense of making a permanent external classical record.

But as Jess Riedel and I have argued, all our experience, like that of Wigner’s friend, is potentially impermanent. Therefore I think it is unreasonable to insist that nothing happens until a permanent record of it is made. Moreover observership, in the anthropic sense, is an introspective property of a system, not a property of how it would behave if measured externally.
If a piece of our universe, centered on the sun, were put in a box with perfectly reflective walls, 1 million light years in diameter, it would take us half a million years to notice any difference. Yet the long term evolution of this isolated system would be radically different from the evolution of the universe we believe we inhabit, lacking this box. The boxed universe would recur repeatedly to near its initial state, and, exponentially more frequently, to Boltzmann brain states, where the recurrence would be confined to a solar-system sized patch near the center, with the remaining volume being thermal and uncorrelated. Nevertheless, the central region would match the solar system as it is now, with all its classical equipment and storage media recording evidence of its supposed multi-billion-year history and the results of recent experiments, and conscious beings having thoughts like ours. So unless one is willing to push the moveable quantum-classical boundary out indefinitely far out, this system would experience what we experience now, but on its orbit false local recurrences would vastly outnumber true ones.

Similarly, we argue, in the thermal de Sitter state of an unboxed universe, false local recurrences would vastly outnumber full recurrences, and these would infinitely outnumber the single first-time occurrence of our solar system in the young expanding universe.
To think about this, it helps to review some basic facts about entanglement and quantum mixed states:

• A mixed state is completely characterized by its density operator $\rho$, which describes all that can be learned by measuring arbitrarily many specimens of the state. For an ensemble of pure states $\{\rho_j, \psi_j\}$, $\rho$ is given by the weighted sum of the projectors onto these states.

• Ensembles with the same $\rho$ are indistinguishable.

• A system $S$ in a mixed state $\rho^S$ can, without loss of generality, be regarded as a subsystem of a larger bipartite system $RS$ in a pure state $\Psi^{RS}$, where $R$ denotes a non-interacting reference system.

• “Steering” Any ensemble $\{\rho_j, \psi_j\}$ compatible with $\rho$ can be remotely generated by performing measurements on the $R$ part of $\Psi^{RS}$. Measurement outcome $j$ occurs with probability $\rho_j$, leaving $S$ in state $\psi_j$. 
Jess Riedel’s scenario suggesting why Boltzmann brains ought to be present in thermal states at any positive temperature, even though there is no external observer.

- Let $\pi_{BB}$ be a projector onto some state representing a fluctuation, for example a copy of the Solar System pasted into a much larger patch of de Sitter vacuum.

- Any finite temperature thermal state $\rho$ of this patch can be expressed as a weighted sum

$$\rho = \lambda \pi_{BB} + (1-\lambda) \sigma$$

where $\sigma$ is a thermal state “depleted” in $\pi_{BB}$.

- An all-powerful Preparator tosses a $\lambda$-biased coin, and prepares $\pi_{BB}$ or $\sigma$ according to the outcome.

- Before departing, the Preparator takes away, in reference system $R$, a record of all this, including, for example, souvenir photos of the just-created Earth and its inhabitants.
Since this is a valid preparation of the thermal state, and keeping in mind that it is impossible in principle to distinguish different preparations of the same mixed state, it is hard to see why the inhabitants of the de Sitter patch do not have some small probability of experiencing a life resembling our own, at least for a while.

Jason Pollack’s reply to this argument: their 2014 paper, alleging the absence of such fluctuations, does not apply to all thermal states, but only those purified by a reference system $R$ of a particular form, so that state $\Psi^{RS}$ is a Bunch-Davies pure state of the universe whose local patches $\rho^S$ are all in thermal de Sitter states. This may be viewed as an Occam-type argument from simplicity, favoring simplicity not of the accessible system $S$, but of the inaccessible purifying system $R$. 
Internal vs External views: Our suggested internal criterion for a state $\rho$ to have nonzero participation of a Boltzmann brain state $\pi_{\text{BB}}$, namely

$$\exists \sigma, \lambda > 0: \quad \rho = \lambda \pi_{\text{BB}} + (1 - \lambda) \sigma$$

is more restrictive than the usual criterion that $\rho$ have a positive expectation when subjected to an external measurement of $\pi_{\text{BB}}$, namely,

$$\text{tr}(\rho \pi_{\text{BB}}) > 0.$$ 

Even a zero temperature vacuum state (the Lorentz vacuum) would have a positive Boltzmann brain probability when measured externally. The energy for creating the Boltzmann brain out of the ground state would come from the measuring apparatus. This is a further reason we think an external measuring apparatus is an encumbrance in a cosmological setting, when reasoning about a system’s internal experiences.
Open questions

• Wigner’s Friend’s experiences, if any

• Does entanglement enable generic fault-tolerant memory and self-organization at equilibrium (escape from Gibbs phase law)

• Are there cosmologies (e.g. eternal inflation) providing perpetual disequilibrium sufficient to support unbounded fault-tolerant classical self-organization


C.H. Bennett  blog post on logical depth versus other complexity measures http://dabacon.org/pontiff/?p=5912

CH Bennett, blog post on  *Schopenhauer and the Geometry of Evil*, https://quantumfrontiers.com/2016/05/29/schopenhauer-and-the-geometry-of-evil/


Extra slides
To make the quantitative definition of logical depth more stable with respect to small variations of the string $x$ and the universal machine $U$, the definition needs to be refined to take weighted account of all programs for computing the object, not just the smallest.

The $s$-significant depth of a string $x$, denoted $D_s(x)$, is defined as the least run time of any $s$-incompressible program to compute $x$:

$$D_s(x) = \min \{ T(p): U(p) = x \land |p| - |p^*| < s \}.$$

Here $p$ ranges over bit strings treated as self-delimiting programs for the universal computer $U$, with $|p|$ denoting the length of $p$ in bits, and $p^*$ denoting the minimal program for $p$, i.e. $p^* = \min \{ q: U(q) = p \}$.

This formalizes the notion that all hypotheses for producing $x$ in fewer than $d$ steps suffer from at least $s$ bits worth of ad-hoc assumptions. Informally, this means they suffer from at least $s$ bits worth of Donald-Duckness.
Physics of Computation Conference Endicott House MIT May 6-8, 1981

1 Freeman Dyson
2 Gregory Chaitin
3 James Crutchfield
4 Norman Packard
5 Panos Ligomenides
6 Jerome Rothstein
7 Carl Hewitt
8 Norman Hardy
9 Edward Fredkin
10 Tom Toffoli
11 Rolf Landauer
12 John Wheeler
13 Frederick Kantor
14 David Leinweber
15 Konrad Zuse
16 Bernard Zeigler
17 Carl Adam Petn
18 Anatol Holt
19 Roland Vollmar
20 Hans Bremerman
21 Donald Greenspan
22 Markus Buettiker
23 Otto Moberth
24 Robert Lewis
25 Robert Suaya
26 Stan Kugel
27 Bill Gosper
28 Lutz Prese
29 Madhu Gupta
30 Paul Benioff
31 Hans Morawecz
32 Ian Richards
33 Manan Pour-El
34 Danny Hills
35 Arthur Burks
36 John Cocke
37 George Michaels
38 Richard Feynman
39 Laurie Lingham
40 Thiagarajan
41 ?
42 Gerard Vichniac
43 Leonid Levin
44 Lev Lyubin
45 Peter Gacs
46 Dan Greenberger
Original form of Occam’s Razor:

“For nothing ought to be posited without a reason given, unless it is self-evident, or known by experience, or proved by the authority of Sacred Scripture”

William of Ockham (ca.1287 – 1347)

Scriptures get less respect nowadays

This article improperly uses one or more religious texts as primary sources without referring to secondary sources that critically analyze them. Please help improve this article by adding references to reliable secondary sources, with multiple points of view. (December 2010)

(Wikipedia warning on early version of Mormon Cosmology article)